














Overdependence on Credit 
Ratings Was a Primary 




By Frank Partnoy, University of San 
Diego School of Law  
 The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Corso Magenta, 63, 20123 Milano (I), web site: www.feem.it, e-mail: working.papers@feem.it 
 
INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS Series 
Editor: Fausto Panunzi 
Overdependence on Credit Ratings Was a Primary Cause of 
the Crisis  
By Frank Partnoy, University of San Diego School of Law  
 
Summary 
The first part of the paper describes how over time credit rating agencies ceased to play the 
role of information intermediaries. Rating agencies did not provide information about the 
risk associated with the securitized instruments, but they simply enabled structurers to 
create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings. 
The second part of the paper suggests how future policy may minimize overdependence on 
credit ratings, by removing regulatory licences and by implementing shock-therapy 
mechanisms to wean investors simple rating mnemonics.
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A primary cause of the recent credit market turmoil was overdependence on credit 
ratings and credit rating agencies.  Without such overdependence, the complex financial 
instruments, particularly collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and structured 
investment vehicles (SIVs), which were at the center of the crisis could not, and would 
not, have been created or sold.  Long-term sustainable policy measures should take into 
account both regulatory and behavioral overdependence on ratings. 
In the first part of the paper, I describe how over time credit rating agencies
1 
ceased to play the role of information intermediaries.  By the time market participants 
recently began to securitize large amounts of subprime mortgages, rating agencies were 
available, not to provide information about the risk associated with the securitized 
instruments, but to facilitate the use of “regulatory licenses”
2 by enabling structurers to 
create and maintain tranches of these instruments with unjustifiably high credit ratings.  
This role went well beyond the standard reputational model of the role of rating agencies.  
In the second part of the paper, I suggest how future policy might minimize 
overdependence on credit ratings, by removing regulatory licenses and by implementing 
                                                 
* George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego School of Law. 
1 By credit rating agencies, I am referring to Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations (NRSROs), as that term was defined during the early 2000s, and in particular to the 
two major NRSROs, Moody’s Investor Service and Standard & Poor’s Rating Services. 
2 By regulatory license, I mean the property rights associated with the ability of a private entity, 
rather than a regulator, to determine the substantive effect of legal rules.  See Partnoy, Frank, 
1999, “The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating 
Agencies,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Vol. 77, pp. 619-712, at 622.   2 
“shock therapy” mechanisms to wean investors off ratings mnemonics.  I also analyze 
how regulators and market participants can learn from the flaws in rating agency models, 
to avoid repeating similar mistakes.  In particular, I focus on the misapplication of 
historical data with respect to estimates of expected default probability, recovery, and 
correlation.  Finally, I assess how market measures of these estimates, based on actual 
prices of traded assets, might substitute for credit ratings for both regulatory and 
behavioral purposes.  
Some background and theory: reputation vs. regulatory licenses 
Historically, information intermediaries have arisen because of information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers, particularly in markets where sellers have 
superior information but cannot costlessly convey this information to buyers.
3  If buyers 
are economically rational, prices in a market with information asymmetry will reflect the 
average quality of a product, and sellers with superior products will bear the cost of the 
information asymmetry.  Consequently, sellers in such a market will have an incentive to 
disclose the superior nature of their product so that they can receive the highest price.  In 
financial markets, to the extent sellers cannot credibly make such disclosures, there are 
incentives for information intermediaries to play this role. 
Information-gathering firms that certify asset quality typically must satisfy three 
criteria before their certification will be credible to outside investors. First, the certifying 
agent must have reputational capital at stake in the certification activity.  In other words, 
the certifying agent credibly must be able to pledge that it will suffer a loss, related either 
to litigation or declining reputation, if its certification is systematically biased or false.  
Second, this expected loss must exceed the expected gain from false certification.  Third, 
                                                 
3 Partnoy, 1999, at 633-36.   3 
the agent’s services must be costly and the cost must be related to the informational 
asymmetry between buyer and seller. 
In the early debt markets, credit rating agencies evolved to play an informational 
intermediary role, from the nineteenth century mercantile credit rating agencies through 
John Moody’s application to bonds.
4  Moody’s insight was that he could profit by selling 
to the public a synthesis of complex bond data into a single letter rating. 
For the most part, credit rating agencies fit this reputational investor-pay model 
until the mid-1970s, when, not coincidentally, the Securities and Exchange Commission  
began relying substantively on credit rating agencies for regulatory purposes and the 
agencies shifted to an issuer-pay model.
5  As the regulatory dependence on ratings 
increased, rating agencies became more profitable and also began providing ratings of 
transactions designed to achieve particular ratings.  During the late 1980s and early 
1990s, bankers and issuers created a range of highly-rated asset-backed transactions and 
collateralized bond obligations, as well as derivative product companies, financial 
guarantor transactions, and AAA-rated arbitrage vehicles.  The first SIVs and asset-
backed CDOs were created during this period. 
As the credit rating agency model shifted from investor-pay to issuer-pay, the 
conditions necessary for the existence of a well-function information intermediary 
                                                 
4 Partnoy, 1999, at 637-38. 
5 More precisely, the regulatory dependence on credit ratings began in 1973, when the SEC 
proposed amending broker-dealer “haircut” requirements, which set forth the percentage of a 
financial asset's market value a broker-dealer was required to deduct for the purpose of 
calculating its net capital requirement.  Rule 15c3-1, promulgated two years later, required a 
different "haircut" based on the credit ratings assigned by Nationally Recognized Statistical 
Rating Organizations (NRSROs).  See 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1.  Since the mid-1970s, statutes and 
regulations increasingly have come to depend explicitly on NRSRO ratings.  See Partnoy, 1999, 
at 690-703. 
   4 
faltered.  The rating agencies faced little or no risk of loss from inaccurate ratings, while 
the potential gains from inaccurate ratings increased.  Ratings substantially lagged the 
revelation of public information about rated issuers and instruments, and rating agencies 
repeatedly were forced to revise ratings substantially downward.  As rating agencies 
began rating substantially greater numbers of issuers and instruments, the resources 
expended per rating necessarily declined, and the cost of providing a rating became 
disconnected from the information gap between investors and issuers.  Finally, the rating 
agencies’ businesses became progressively more profitable, even as the informational 
value of their ratings declined. 
During the 1990s, overdependence on credit ratings led many market participants 
to create highly-rated fixed income instruments that carried attractive yields relative to 
comparable assets, but that also carried new risks typically not associated with highly-
rated bonds.  The bond market crisis in 1994-95 was driven by structured notes and other 
derivatives transactions, including mortgage-backed transactions, which were designed to 
achieve high ratings, even though they carried other embedded risks.  More recently, 
overdependence on credit ratings played a significant role in the collapse of Enron.
6   
With respect to mortgages, “first-level” securitizations were a response to the 
investment grade “cliff” noted by W. Braddock Hickman,
7 and later Michael Milken, 
                                                 
6 The following assessment from Senator Joseph Lieberman, whose Senate committee held the 
first hearings on Enron, was typical: “The credit-rating agencies were dismally lax in their 
coverage of Enron. They didn’t ask probing questions and generally accepted at face value 
whatever Enron’s officials chose to tell them. And while they claim to rely primarily on public 
filings with the SEC, analysts from Standard and Poor’s not only did not read Enron’s proxy 
statement, they didn’t even know what information it might contain.” Senate Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, press release, “Financial Oversight of Enron: The SEC and Private-Sector 
Watchdogs” (October 8, 2002). 
7 See Hickman, W. Braddock, 1958, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience, National 
Bureau of Economic Research.   5 
who saw that portfolios of sub-investment grade rated bonds outperformed more highly-
rated bonds on a risk adjusted basis.  Market participants adapted this insight to 
mortgages of various types, which could be pooled into new highly-rated fixed income 
instruments.  Surprisingly, this “cliff” persisted over time, in both corporate bond and 
mortgage markets; the large yield discontinuity between investment grade and below-
investment grade ratings did not disappear even after large amounts of securities were 
issued.  To the contrary, in the early 2000s, rating agency models, and assumptions about 
historical default, recovery, and correlation, suggested that extant mortgage-backed 
securities could be repackaged and resold in ways that would outperform, not only the 
mortgage-backed securities themselves, but other comparably rated securities. 
The growth of “second-level” mortgage securitization 
As the credit derivatives market was experiencing record growth, fixed income 
structurers and investors, with the assistance of credit rating agencies, searched for assets 
that could be securitized to create highly-rated fixed income instruments with attractive 
yields relative to comparable investments.  For the first time, banks began seriously 
considering “second-level” securitizations of “first-level” mortgage-backed securities 
(which were securitizations of mortgages).   
The fundamental economic rationale for “second-level” securitizations is not 
obvious.  After all, the underlying mortgage assets already have been securitized.  Indeed, 
the mortgage-backed securities market was already a deep market, driven by high 
demand from both originators and investors.  Mortgage-backed securities were issued in 
a competitive environment in large numbers, and already were rated by the rating 
agencies.  “First-level” securitization transactions were a response to gaps and   6 
inefficiencies in the underlying market for individual assets.  To the extent mortgages 
were being allocated or bundled inefficiently, or not in ways investors desired, one might 
have expected that continuous “first-level” securitization would evolve to ameliorate 
these inefficiencies.  Put another way, if there had been a more efficient way of pooling 
mortgages, or a pocket of unsatisfied demand for particular pool portfolios or structures, 
investors likely would have demanded it, and then banks would have created and 
supplied it. 
Yet the proliferation of “second-level” mortgage-backed CDOs and SIVs 
suggested that billions of dollars of “first-level” mortgage-backed securities appeared to 
be mispriced.  Market participants could pool those securities into new special purpose 
entities with tranched capital structures, and sell the slices of those structures for more 
than the value of the underlying mortgage-backed securities.  These transactions, too, 
persisted over time, so much so that the appetite for “second-level” mortgage 
securitizations drove financial intermediaries both to originate new and increasingly risky 
mortgages, and to create synthetic exposure to mortgages, which then could be 
resecuritized through tranched special purpose entities, again at higher prices than the 
underlying mortgage-backed securities were trading in the market. 
To obtain ratings for “second-level” mortgage securitizations, both the structurers 
and the rating agencies used models based on earlier corporate bond-backed transactions, 
which provided a methodology for labeling the risks associated with mortgage securities-
backed transactions.  Bankers increasingly sought to combine the underlying securities 
and to stratify capital structures in ways that would create new investment grade-rated   7 
securities.  In particular, CDOs and SIVs were designed to create large tranches of AAA-
rated assets backed by lower-rated mortgage-backed securities. 
Even after a mortgage-backed security had been re-securitized through cash-flow 
based CDOs, market participants suggested that there was no reason why investors 
couldn’t take on exposure to a particular mortgage-backed security more than once.  
Arrangers created synthetic exposure based on side bets derived from the value of the 
underlying mortgage-backed securities so that investors could obtain exposure to the 
performance of a pool of mortgages without having an investment vehicle or special 
purpose entity actually buy the mortgage-backed securities.  Synthetic CDOs and SIVs 
obtained exposure through derivatives transactions, most commonly credit default swaps. 
Credit ratings as drivers of “second-level” securitizations 
The linchpin of a CDO or a SIV backed in whole or part by synthetic assets was 
the credit rating.  Investors typically did not examine the underlying assets of a synthetic 
CDO or SIV in any detail or at all.  One might criticize them for not doing so, except that 
the underlying assets frequently were not even specified when the deal was sold.  Instead, 
investors relied on parameters set by the arrangers, bankers, and rating agencies to 
constrain the assets that could be purchased originally, and held over time. 
If the credit rating agencies, and their clients, had used reasonable and accurate 
models and assumptions, then in principle these transactions might not have been 
problematic.  However, these parties faced financial incentives to use unreasonable and 
inaccurate assumptions and models to complete deals and thereby earn greater fees.  
These incentives were especially strong given the expected absence of any reputational 
consequence, particularly for individuals involved in transactions, who essentially could   8 
sell long-term options obligating their firms while pocketing shorter-term bonuses for 
themselves.  The way to obtain sufficiently attractive ratings to pay the high transaction 
costs and fees for the various arranging parties, and still generate attractive yields for 
purchasers was to use models and assumptions that did not reflect the actual risk of the 
underlying mortgages, including risks that already were impounded in the price of those 
securities in the market for mortgage-backed securities.
8 
The simplest way to generate unwarranted high ratings was to use outdated and 
inapplicable historical assumptions with respect to the underlying mortgage-backed 
securities.  The inputs to the relevant models were straightforward: expected default rate, 
recovery rate upon default, and, for portfolios of assets, the correlation of expected 
defaults.  The rating agencies created models, with the assistance of bankers and 
arrangers, that generated tranche credit ratings for “second-level” deals based on these 
inputs.  Those models, in turn, typically depended on assumptions with respect to the 
expected statistical distribution that returns on the underlying collateral would follow. 
Given these assumptions and models, arrangers were then free to find collateral 
that would generate the most attractive tranche yields, subject to ratings-based 
constraints.  The restrictions on collateral typically were based on credit ratings; in other 
words, the “second-level” securitization methodology depended on previous “first-level” 
securitization ratings.  As the prices of mortgage-backed securities rose, along with 
housing prices, it was difficult to generate “second-level” deals with highly-rated 
tranches without using increasingly unreasonable assumptions.  As collateral became 
more expensive and ratings of that collateral lagged increasing market prices, accurate 
                                                 
8 Mason, Joseph R. and Joshua Rosner, 2007, “Where Did the Risk Go? How Misapplied Bond 
Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligation Market 
Disruptions,” SSRN Working Paper: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475, May 3, 2007.   9 
and timely ratings would have appeared lower than would have been warranted.  This lag 
provided a rationale for increasingly aggressive assumptions with respect to “second-
level” deals. 
Paradoxically, when housing prices began to fall, but ratings on “first-level” 
securitizations did not, the historical ratings methodology made “second-level” 
securitizations increasingly attractive.  If one could buy AAA-rated mortgage-backed 
securities that had fallen in price, but still use the same historical default, recovery, and 
correlation assumptions associated with AAA ratings in the relevant model, one could 
create a highly-rated, high-yielding set of “second-level” transactions.  As long as 
mortgage-backed securities ratings lagged market prices, as those prices declined, CDOs 
and SIVs backed by that collateral would appear increasingly attractive. 
Rating agency assumptions and models did not accurately capture the risk 
associated with “second-level” securitizations.
9  Default rate assumptions were derived 
from historical information, including default data about other asset categories as well as 
asset price correlations, rather than default correlations.  Moreover, assumptions for 
“second-level” deals were based on ratings of mortgage-backed securities, even when 
both the rating agencies and other participants in the resecuritization transactions were 
aware that both that the credit quality of the underlying mortgages had declined and that 
the expected default correlations associated with those mortgages had increased.  
                                                 
9 The SEC investigation of the credit rating agencies found that the struggled to adapt to the 
complexity of mortgage-backed structured finance deals.  See Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008, “Summary Report of Issues Identified in the Commission Staff’s 
Examinations of Select Credit Rating Agencies,” July, at 12 (“One analyst expressed concern that 
her firm’s model did not capture ‘half’ of the deal’s risk, but that ‘it could be structured by cows 
and we would rate it.’”).  The SEC also found that “Rating agencies made ‘out of model’ 
adjustments and did not document the rationale for the adjustment.”  Id. at 14.   10 
Nevertheless, the simulations the agencies ran to calculate tranche ratings were based on 
stale and inaccurate assumptions.  
Rating agency correlation assumptions were particularly important.
10  Inaccurate 
correlation assumptions based on incorrect statistical models enabled parties to structure 
deals with high ratings on senior tranches, given that the expected correlation of defaults 
of mortgage-backed securities was higher than the estimates used for the models.
11  The 
rating agencies have struggled to understand the importance of correlation assumptions 
for CDOs and SIVs, even as those assumptions supported a sharply increasing number of 
“second-level” securitizations.  Moody’s conducted an in-depth study of corporate bond 
correlation, which led to a new Monte Carlo simulation-based market tool in 2004 for 
measuring the credit risk of synthetic transactions; it revised its methodology for 
structured finance asset correlations a year later.
12  S&P’s inputs simply remained 
constant for years.
13  By 2006 and 2007 at the latest, it was apparent that the relevant 
mortgage asset correlations underlying CDOs and SIVs were significantly higher than the 
rating agencies had assumed.  By February 2008, Moody’s had downgraded at least one 
tranche of 94.2% of subprime residential mortgage-backed deals it had rated in 2006.
14 
                                                 
10 See Hull, John, and Alan White, 2006, “Valuing Credit Derivatives Using An Implied Copula 
Approach,” Journal of Derivatives, Winter; van Deventer, Donald R., CDOs and the Credit 
Crisis: Complexity and Model Risk in the Collateralized Debt Obligation Market Are Severe, 
2008, Bank Accounting and Finance, June, at 7 (“Management has often discovered that the 
working-level staff has been depending heavily on models, like the copula approach, that were 
known or should have been known to be wrong.”). 
11 Moody’s Investors Service, 2006, “Moody’s Modeling Approach to Rating Structured Finance 
Cash Flow CDO Transactions,” September, at 10. 
12 See Moody’s Investors Service, 2005, “Collateralised Debt Obligations: A Moody’s Primer,” 
March, at 5-6; Moody’s Investors Service, 2005, “Moody’s Revisits its Assumptions Regarding 
Structured Finance Default (and Asset ) Correlations for CDOs,” June. 
13 See Partnoy, Frank, 2006, “How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other 
Gatekeepers,” in Financial Gatekeepers: Can They Protect Investors? (Yasuyuki Fuchita and 
Robert E. Litan, eds.). 
14 See Moody’s Investors Service, 2008, “A Short Guide to Subprime,” March, at 3.   11 
In sum, the proliferation of “second-level” securitization transactions is consistent 
with substantial overdependence on credit ratings.  If ratings had been accurate, or put 
another way if investors had relied on ratings only to the extent they were accurate, then 
there would have been little incentive for “second-level” securitizations.  But because 
investors were willing to buy CDO and SIV tranches simply because of their high ratings 
and high yields, either because of regulatory reliance on ratings or because the mnemonic 
device of ratings came to play an overly-important private role, CDO and SIV tranches 
had higher-than-justified ratings, even though they held collateral that already had been 
securitized.  Without overreliance on ratings, investors more likely would have looked 
through the complexity of CDO and SIV transactions to the underlying mortgage-backed 
securities, and prices more accurately would have reflected market estimates of default 
probability, recovery, and correlation.  
Regulatory vs. behavioral overdependence 
  To what extent was overdependence on ratings driven by regulation?  I previously 
have argued that rating agencies increasingly sell “regulatory licenses” rather than 
information, and that ratings are not “opinions,” but instead are keys that unlock the 
financial markets for regulated entities.
15  Regulators recently have endorsed this 
explanation, and the SEC has proposed rules to eliminate certain aspects of regulatory 
dependence on ratings.
16 
  In addition, it is apparent that, even putting aside regulatory influences, at least 
some market participants independently over rely on ratings.  At its core, this 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
15 Partnoy, 1999. 
16 See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, References to Ratings of Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release Nos. IC-28327, IA-2751, File No. S7-19-
08.   12 
overreliance likely derives from decades of regulatory dependence on ratings, but it has 
become a more widespread, behavioral phenomenon.  Ratings are part of financial 
culture.  Even after the massive dislocation associated with the recent crisis, and the 
abysmal performance of the rating agencies, market participants have continued to rely 
on letter ratings.  One conclusion is that even if all explicit references to ratings were 
removed from regulation, some residual implicit overreliance would remain.   
  An interesting perspective on this behavioral point arises from the fact that the 
major banks selling “second-level” securitizations also misperceived the risks associated 
with the highest-rated tranches.  Indeed, it appears that bank officers were so confident 
about the high ratings of super-senior CDO tranches that they concluded that such 
tranches posed virtually no risk.  One reason, if not the primary reason, why they 
misperceived such risks was overreliance on credit rating agency assumptions and 
models.  Some of this overreliance derived from bank regulations that depend on credit 
ratings; the rest was cultural. 
  Most strikingly, sanguine assessments of super-senior risk, and assumptions that 
senior tranches protected by AAA-rated junior tranches could not default, appeared to be 
so obviously correct that banks’ exposure to these tranches apparently remained hidden 
from senior managers, investors, and regulators.  No bank publicly disclosed risks 
associated with super-senior tranches before the crisis began.  Bank directors and officers 
claimed, perhaps falsely, that they were unaware of risks associated with these tranches.  
Moreover, many regulators apparently were unaware of the exposure as well.  The Bank 
of England, in its Financial Stability Report, noted that banks were net buyers of credit 
protection in 2006; that estimate apparently did not reflect the large amounts of notional   13 
credit protection sold by banks in super-senior transactions.
17  These estimates are set 
forth in Chart 1 below. 
Chart 1 – Outstanding Global Amounts of Credit Protection Bought By Institutions 
Sources: BBA and Bank calculations.
(a)  Amounts netted across long and short positions.
 
  Much of the blame for overdependence on ratings can be placed on regulation, 
and I set forth below some measures designed to eliminate this overdependence.  But 
market participants also independently over relied on ratings.  High ratings replaced 
independent judgment, particularly when “second-level” transactions created the illusion 
of thick bands of highly-rated protective tranches.  The collapse of senior securities of 
both CDOs and SIVs illustrates that “second-level” securitizations require an analysis of 
something more than just tranche ratings.  Because these instruments are so much more 
complex than the underlying “first-level” securitizations, they generate a greater need for 
investigation, and paradoxically are more amenable to overreliance on ratings. 
                                                 
17 Bank of England, 2008, “Financial Stability Report,” April, Chart 2.17.  The Bank for 
International Settlements had been warning about overreliance on ratings since early 2005.  See 
Committee on the Global Financial System, Bank for International Settlements, 2005, “The Role 
of Ratings in Structured Finance: Issues and Implications,” January.   14 
Some policy prescriptions 
If the story about overreliance on credit ratings is even partially correct, what is to 
be done?  There are two categories of policy responses, some of which already have been 
proposed.  First, regulators should eliminate explicit reliance on credit ratings.  To the 
extent regulators are concerned that such an approach would leave a substantive void, 
there are many substitutes for ratings, including market measures of risk, as described 
below.  Second, regulators should implement some form of “shock therapy” to jar market 
participants from overreliance on ratings.  The use of mnemonics is highly path 
dependent, and unless there are strong reasons for participants to switch, they will not. 
With respect to the first point, the SEC already has proposed removing references 
to NRSROs in its own rules.  For example, Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act 
limits a money market fund’s portfolio investments to securities that have received credit 
ratings from NRSROs in one of the two highest short-term rating categories.
18  The SEC 
recommended replacing this NRSRO “regulatory license” with a requirement that money 
market fund boards of directors determine “that each portfolio instrument presents 
minimal credit risks.”
19  Likewise, other SEC proposals would replace several other rules 
that depend explicitly on NRSRO ratings. 
Notwithstanding the intense lobbying effort against these proposals, the SEC 
should implement them as final.  Moreover, other regulatory bodies should similarly 
excise references to credit ratings.  In the United States, the most efficient mechanism for 
doing this would be for Congress formally to remove references from statutes, and then 
                                                 
18 See Investment Company Act, Rule 2a-7(a)(10), (21). 
19 See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, References to Ratings of Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release Nos. IC-28327, at 8.   15 
to hold hearings to encourage various agencies to remove any additional remaining 
references in both formal rules and informal policies.   
Perhaps the most important regulatory references to ratings are in international 
banking regulations, particularly under the Basel II agreement of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision.  Basel II explicitly allows banking regulators to permit banks to use 
credit ratings from approved rating agencies in calculating their net capital reserve 
requirements.  International regulators should remove this provision, and in place of letter 
ratings substitute market-based measures, such as credit spreads or credit default swap 
prices, and/or discretionary estimates of default probability, expected recovery, and 
correlation.  The Bank for International Settlements has long been a leader in publicizing 
problems associated with the use of ratings in structured finance.
20  It now should 
explicitly disclaim the use of ratings in regulation generally. 
Ratings and rating agencies also have been subsidized by other forms of 
regulation, and those subsidies should be removed as well.  NRSROs are specifically 
exempt under U.S. securities law from Section 11 liability and Regulation FD; they 
should not be.  Nor should rating agencies be exempt from liability for statutory and 
common law private claims based on any freedom of speech or journalistic privilege 
rationales.  Historically, the rating agencies have interposed First Amendment objections 
in civil litigation, with some success.
21  As new cases based on “second-level” 
securitizations arise, judges should distinguish those prior cases, and make it clear that 
rating agencies are subject to civil liability and are not protected by any First Amendment 
                                                 
20 See Bank for International Settlements, 2005. 
21 See Partnoy, 2006.   16 
privilege.  Legislators also should consider clarifying the viability of private rights of 
action against rating agencies. 
The rating agencies’ position that ratings are merely “opinions,” and therefore are 
entitled to the same protection as other “speakers,” is specious in the context of complex 
securitization transactions.  Ratings of “second-level” securitizations are not protected 
speech, and rating agencies are doing much more than merely speaking.  They have a 
high level of initial and ongoing involvement in these deals, at early and later stages, and 
receive significantly higher fees for them.  Rating agencies determine the capital cushions 
that are required for particular tranches; they provide capital matrix parameters that 
govern the operation of special purpose entity issuers; they are involved in the operation 
of the issuers on an ongoing basis; they instruct the asset manager regarding the kinds of 
assets the issuers can acquire, both initially and over time; and the deal documentation for 
these transactions typically includes descriptions of the simulation models the rating 
agencies use to determine the relative proportions of an entity’s capital structure, as well 
as the necessarily over-collateralization ratios and triggers, both initially and over time.  
Moreover, unlike corporate bond transactions, CDOs and SIVs require a much more in 
depth analysis by the rating agencies, including the use of their mathematical models and 
assumptions.  For these reasons, judges should reject the claim that ratings of “second-
level” securitizations are merely “opinions.” 
With respect to second point regarding “shock therapy,” regulators should 
encourage investors not to apply the same ratings and analysis to corporate bonds versus   17 
structured finance assets.
22  Ratings of these instruments are categorically different, and it 
was and is a mistake for anyone to use the same mnemonic for each category.  A highly-
rated CDO does not pose the same risks as other highly-rated securities, including the 
collateral underlying the CDO.  To the extent regulators and investors continue to rely on 
ratings, which they should not, at minimum their rating-based rules should distinguish 
between the symbology of corporate bonds and structured finance instruments, if not 
other categories as well.  Ideally, regulators and investors should find independent means 
of assessing the risks of different investments within different categories.  Forcing 
investors to split ratings among categories should lead private actors to reassess their 
approach to risk. 
Disclosure with respect to credit derivatives and credit rating-based transactions 
also must improve.  Current disclosure of notional amounts and value-at-risk (VAR) does 
not enable investors to assess the risks associated with default, expected recovery, and 
correlation of fixed income exposure.  One reason for the recent collapse of major 
financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and AIG 
was the lack of transparency with respect to “second-level” securitizations.  When no one 
has enough information to evaluate the risk of portfolios held by financial institutions, the 
valuation of their issued securities becomes at best a guess.  At minimum, bank regulators 
should require that financial institutions disclose to examiners not only VAR-related 
measures, but also more robust worst-case analyses and stress tests based on a wide range 
of assumptions about expected default, recovery, and correlation.  Requiring such 
disclosures also would encourage market participants to rely on these measures directly, 
                                                 
22 The SEC has proposed such a split.  See Securities and Exchange Commission, 2008, Proposed 
Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Release No. 34-57967, File 
No. S7-13-08, June.   18 
instead of letter ratings.  It also would encourage dissemination of risk disclosure to bank 
officers and directors. 
As regulators and investors seek substitutes for credit ratings, they should 
consider looking to market measures and prices.  Notwithstanding recent market 
volatility and dislocations, market prices provided a far more accurate assessment of risk 
than credit ratings.  Such prices and related market measures are available from true 
information intermediaries, which now play a modern version of the role John Moody 
originally envisioned in the early twentieth century: providing valuable information about 
credit risk.  Most prominently, Markit Group Limited provides credit default swap 
pricing and other data that investors could use to assess the risk of their portfolios over 
time.  It would vastly improve policy and market efficiency if regulators and investors 
relied on this kind of data instead of credit ratings.  
An example based on data from Markit is set forth in Chart 2 below.  The chart 
depicts the daily 5-year Bear Stearns senior credit default swap closing spreads, along 
with a 30- and 90-day rolling average of these spreads.  Note that the credit ratings 
applicable to Bear Stearns’s senior debt were constant at single-A throughout this period.   19 









































































































































To the extent regulators or institutions are concerned about the volatility of 
market based measures, it would be straightforward to reference a rolling average like 
one of those depicted above.  Reliance on market measures instead of credit ratings likely 
would have led institutions with exposure to Bear Stearns securities to assess their 
exposure more closely during the period leading up to that firm’s collapse.  Instead of 
regulating and making investment decisions based on a Bear Stearns credit rating that 
remained unjustifiably high and unchanged during that bank’s crisis and collapse, 
regulators and institutions instead could have looked to a rolling average of market 
measures.  Credit default swap spreads provided an early warning to market participants 
regarding Bear Stearns.   20 
Moreover, the use of market measures would have beneficial ex ante effects, 
particularly if regulators also adopt the heightened disclosure requirements outlined 
above.  For example, if Bear Stearns officials had known both that their firm would not 
be rescued and that investors would sell their securities in response to a rapid 
deterioration in prices, they would have been forced to be more proactive about 
disclosing risks in advance, particularly with respect to “second-level” securitizations, 
and perhaps as a result bank employees would not have taken on the key risks that led to 
the bank’s collapse. 
Not every regulator or market participant would need to rely on market measures 
as a substitute for ratings.  Some could rely on professional judgment, as the SEC has 
suggested in its proposed Rule 2a-7 amendments.  Others could rely on third-party 
information providers.  Some might continue to rely on Moody’s and S&P, although the 
overwhelming evidence suggest that such reliance would be misguided.  In any event, a 
shift to permitting reliance on market-based measures would help discourage overreliance 
on letter ratings.   
Switching to market-based measures is not a radical concept.  Indeed, even the 
credit rating agencies themselves increasingly use market-based measures.  Letter ratings 
essentially have become shorthand labels based on assumptions about key variables: 
probability of default, expected recovery in the event of default, and correlation.  
Internally, the rating agencies generate letter ratings based on estimates of these 
variables.
23  At minimum, regulators and market participants should switch to relying on 
                                                 
23 With respect to mortgage-backed securities, prepayment risk also is a relevant variable.  
Prepayment risk was an important factor during the 1994-95 interest rate crisis, but did not play a 
major role during the recent sub-prime crisis.    21 
actual estimates of these variables instead of letter ratings that amalgamate the variables 
in an opaque, outdated, and incomprehensible fashion. 
Conclusion 
  Causation is a complex concept.  It has both “but for” and “proximate” elements.  
As a matter of “but for” causation, there is a strong argument that credit ratings and credit 
rating agencies caused the crisis.  “Second-level” mortgage-backed securitizations, 
particularly CDOs and SIVs, explicitly depended on rating agency letter ratings.  Without 
those ratings, the transactions could not, and would not, have happened.  Without the 
ability to obtain high ratings for CDO and SIV tranches, there would have been little 
appetite for overpriced lower-rated mortgage collateral.  Without that appetite, there 
would have been little pressure leading to the proliferation of sub-prime mortgages, 
because those mortgages could not have been offloaded through “second-level” 
securitizations.  Without the proliferation of low quality mortgages, there would not have 
been a dramatic housing market rise and fall, with the attendant ripple effects.   
  It is more difficult to say whether credit ratings were a “proximate” cause of the 
crisis, but there are strong arguments here as well.  Overreliance on ratings led banks to 
hold super-senior exposure they otherwise would have assessed more carefully.  
Overreliance on ratings led regulators to misperceive the extent to which speculation on 
sub-prime mortgages had spread, or to where.  Overreliance on ratings led institutional 
investors to take on hidden correlation bets, which their directors, officers, and 
shareholders did not understand. 
  Overreliance on ratings was a central component of the credit crisis.  In 
responding to the crisis, and in planning and implementing reforms, regulators should not   22 
focus exclusively on proposals related to lending abuses, bank rescues, credit expansion, 
and macroeconomic or cyclical factors.  They should not miss the crucial role of credit 
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